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Abstract— Future human spaceflight missions will face the 
complex challenge of performing human extravehicular 
activity (EVA) beyond the low Earth orbit (LEO) 
environment. Astronauts will become increasingly isolated 
from Earth-based mission support and thus will rely heavily 
on their own decision-making capabilities and onboard tools 
to accomplish proposed EVA mission objectives. To better 
address time delay communication issues, EVA characters, 
e.g. flight controllers, astronauts, etc., and their respective 
work practices and roles need to be better characterized and 
understood. This paper presents the results of a study 
examining the EVA work domain and the personnel that 
operate within it. The goal is to characterize current and 
historical roles of ground support, intravehicular (IV) crew 
and EV crew, their communication patterns and information 
needs. This work provides a description of EVA operations 
and identifies issues to be used as a basis for future 
investigation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The NASA human spaceflight program has successfully 
completed well over 1326 hours of extravehicular activity 
(EVA) throughout its 50 year history [1]. Thanks to the 
incremental developments made throughout the Gemini, 
Apollo, Skylab, Shuttle, and International Space Station 
(ISS) programs, EVAs have become one of NASA’s most 
iconic and essential component of human spaceflight, 
demonstrating a range of capabilities including hardware 
assembly, maintenance, and repair as well as scientific 
support [2]. For the purposes of this study, an EVA is 
defined as “any space operation or activity performed 
outside the protective environment of a spacecraft 
therefore requiring supplemental or independent life 
support equipment for the astronaut” [3], pg. 5.  The vast 
majority of EVAs conducted to date have all occurred in a 
region above Earth (~100 to 1000 km) known as Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO). The Apollo EVAs serve as the only 
precedent for EVAs beyond LEO, yet even these EVAs 
operated within the Earth-Moon system. A universal 
characteristic inherent among all performed EVAs is the 
absences of delayed communication linkages between 
crew and mission control due to light-time delay. Light-
time delay is associated with the vast distances the 
communication relays must travel to reach mission 
control located on Earth. Table I summarizes the one way 
time-delay for transmissions sent between Earth and 
various destinations currently under examination for 
future exploration missions. 
Table I. Potential Future Human EVA Environments 
Destination Lunar NEOs Mars 
    Lunar DRO Close Opposition 
Distance from 
Earth, km 3.84E+05 Variable  5.57E+07 4.01E+08 
One-Way Time 
Delay, s (min) 1.3 Variable 
185.8 
(3.1) 
1338.6 
(22.3) 
Mission 
Duration, days Variable 20-30 895-950 
Ref. [4] [5], [6] [4] 
Central to the theme of this study and future works is to 
better understand the current EVA work domain with the 
eventual goal of understanding EVAs in the context of 
deep space, communication time-delayed missions. More 
specifically, how will the paradigm between mission 
control center (MCC) and onboard crewmembers have to 
change to ensure EVA mission success without real-time 
communication? Current EVA operations leverage 50 
years of EVA experience operating with the real-time 
communication support capability by MCC, with the 
exception of periodic loss of signal events.  
Goals of this Investigation 
The purpose of this study is to identify the primary and 
secondary operators involved in conducting an EVA in 
present-day operations. The goal is to characterize current 
and roles and responsibilities of these operators, and to 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140013480 2019-08-31T17:00:07+00:00Z
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examine their communication patterns and information 
needs. This work provides a current day perspective of 
EVA operations and identifies issues to be used as a basis 
for future investigation. A communication link analysis of 
an historical EVA is also shown to provide a synthesized 
view of actual flight audio during an EVA. Apollo 16 
EVA 4 was selected as a case study because it serves as 
the only EVA conducted beyond LEO that was not 
affiliated with operating directly on the moon’s surface. 
This operational environment is analogous to the future 
asteroid redirect missions currently being planned by 
NASA [5]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The 
literature review is outlined in Section 2, followed by the 
discussion of the research methods in Section 3. Section 4 
provides an EVA description. The EVA information flow 
model and communication analysis is presented in 
Section 5 and 6, respectively. A discussion of the results 
and study limitations is located in Sections 7 and 
conclusions along with proposed future work are 
discussed in Section 8. 
2. BACKGROUND 
EVAs have been a topic of study from a variety of 
perspectives ranging from procedural timeline 
development [7], tool development [8], and human health 
and performance [9]. The majority of studies have 
focused solely on evaluations of either the EVA 
crewmembers or MCC. However, the existing literature 
lacks an examination of the interactions between MCC 
and crewmembers during real-time operations. 
Previous studies have examined the MCC to understand 
how MCC flight controllers and support staff support 
real-time human spaceflight activities [10], [11]. The 
MCC is divided among a set of console positions and 
primarily communicates via a set of voice communication 
loops (see Ref. [10] for a description of MCC structure 
and voice loops). MCC studies to-date have not 
specifically examined the EVA domain. This study 
contributes to this body of knowledge by focusing on the 
specific set of voice loops and console positions within 
MCC known as the EVA front control room (FCR) 
console and EVA multipurpose support room (MPSR) 
console positions.  
Crewmember focused research includes time and motion 
studies [12], [13] and evaluations of task efficiency [14], 
[15]. In particular, Ney and Looper, by examining task 
time-to-completion, revealed that current ISS EVAs 
exhibit a level of efficiency that, while adequate for ISS 
mission objectives, is undesirably low for future human 
space operations due to the increased constraints on 
available resources. Building upon the EVA efficiency 
work, Marquez (2010) integrated an augmented 
classification of EVA tasks with a comparison of planned 
versus as-run timelines. Results indicated specific areas 
within an EVA timeline that demanded more time and 
areas of decreased efficiency such as support equipment 
setup. However, no evaluation or conclusions were made 
regarding MCC support activities or how MCC support 
integrated with crewmember activities. 
The work that has focused on the interactions of MCC 
and crewmembers, particularly within a time-delayed 
environment, exists in analog simulation. There are 
numerous analog sites where field-testing of hardware 
and spaceflight operations occurs such as NASA Extreme 
Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO) and Desert 
Research and Technology Studies (D/RATS). Recent 
lessons learned from these analog studies indicate the 
complimentary nature of having both voice and text 
capability for crew and MCC communication. In the 
presence of 50-second communication latency, MCC and 
EVA crewmembers demonstrated they could operate and 
meet their mission objectives, if the EVA timeline was 
constructed to accommodate the round-trip 
communication delay with MCC. However, when 
unexpected situations were simulated, communications 
broke down for both 5 and 10-minute latencies [16]. 
There is a demonstrated need to better understand EVA 
operations within this time-delayed environment and to 
assess the potential impacts of crew training and 
technological support. 
Along with field-analogs, virtual simulations have also 
been conducted at NASA JSC though the RATS 2012 
campaign [17] and the Autonomous Mission Operations 
(AMO) study [18]. Both of these studies employed a 
series of virtual reality simulation environments to mimic 
deep space operations. RATS 2012 reiterated the 
importance of having a dedicated intravehicular activity 
(IVA) crewmember to handle communications with 
ground communication, similar to how both Shuttle and 
ISS EVAs operated. However, this study, along with the 
previous field-analog simulations, lacked an examination 
of the information needs, communication patterns, and 
work practices of the EVA operators to explain the 
reasons for the observed performance in operations. 
While not specifically examining EVA operations, the 
AMO study, conducted at the Deep Space Habitat at JSC, 
provides some insight to the possible technological 
impacts related to mitigating time-delay impacts from 
both the MCC and crew perspective. This study examined 
a baseline and mitigation configuration to experimentally 
investigate whether different technology aides could 
mitigate some of the challenges caused by time-delay. 
Workload and coordination difficulty between the ground 
and flight crew were shown to increase with time delay, 
but to a lesser extent when mitigation tools where 
implemented. However, ground crew workload increased, 
regardless of configuration, with time delay. The same 
tools that were attributed by the participants to reduce 
their workload, acted to both reduce and increase 
workload for the ground crew [18]. The results of this 
study indicated that there is a place for advanced 
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technology in the time-delayed arena but further work is 
needed to develop these tools and to assess their impact, 
especially if this sort of technology is added to support the 
EVA work domain. 
While there is much to be learned from 50+ years of 
human spaceflight EVA, there is a growing interest for 
more advanced human-system technology development 
for a sustained human presence beyond LEO.  Recently 
published literature outlines the need for new systems to 
support humans in a variety of roles, which include 
mobility, data acquisition, information technology, 
autonomous science and assembly, and decision-making 
[19]. NASA research efforts have already identified 
numerous challenges when operating in a communication-
delayed environment such as: reduced crew situation 
awareness, wasted crew time, and an impaired ability to 
transfer relevant information between flight crew and 
mission control and vice versa [20]. To overcome the 
presented challenges of operating in a communication-
delayed environment, understanding the communication 
dynamics between operators as well as technological 
implications are key. This study begins to address the 
aforementioned considerations by establishing the current 
operational environment in which crewmembers and 
MCC interact during EVA. 
3. METHODS AND MATERIALS 
This study consists of two complimentary efforts. The 
first being the development of an information flow model 
of the current EVA work domain, and the second being a 
communication analysis of the Apollo 16 EVA 4 air-to-
ground voice communication transcript. The information 
flow model describes how the work is distributed among 
the EVA operators and how those operators communicate 
with each other. There is a need to detail current EVA 
operations in order to incrementally work towards 
overcoming the challenges within a time-delayed 
environment. The communication analysis provides some 
historical context by describing the communication 
pathways and the frequencies of those pathways as well 
as the content of communication between the EVA 
operators for the only EVA performed beyond LEO that 
was not related to moon surface operations. Again, there 
is need to leverage historical examples to provide a 
reference point for future work in EVA operations 
studies.  
Information Flow Model 
An information flow model is a component within a 
larger research framework known as contextual inquiry 
(see Ref. [21] for a description of contextual inquiry). 
Previous studies have implemented contextual inquiry 
models to examine work domains such as airline 
operations [22]. The information flow model was 
completed by conducting a qualitative assessment of the 
resources available within the EVA community at JSC.  
Various sources of data at NASA JSC were leveraged 
which included relevant stakeholders, and internal 
documentation and historical EVAs. Stakeholders within 
the EVA community, such as EVA flight controllers, 
support staff and instructors, were identified and a 
campaign of semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with these personnel at JSC during a 10-week period 
between May and August of 2014. The goal of the 
interviews was to gain an account of the activities and 
processes that occur during an EVA from the experts 
themselves. The semi-structured format relied on a 
preplanned set of questions to elicit interviewees’ 
descriptions of working on EVA console, what sort of 
tasks they conduct, and who they communicated with 
during a mission. For those interviewees who had EVA 
flight controller certifications, interviews were audio 
recorded and later transcribed for qualitative data 
analysis. The remaining interviews were recorded via 
handwritten notes made by the interviewer. 
Apollo 16 EVA 4 Communication Analysis 
The second effort focused on describing a real-world 
EVA (Apollo 16 EVA 4) air-to-ground voice 
communication transcript. This EVA was conducted in a 
similar operational environment (i.e. to future possible 
asteroid redirect missions). A communication link 
analysis was performed to show the existence and 
frequency of communications between the primary 
operators within the domain [23]. The archived air-to-
ground transcript of Apollo 16 EVA 4 was downloaded 
from the Apollo Lunar Surface Journal and analyzed [24]. 
The examined transcript, which includes pre and post 
EVA activities started at 212:44:37 ground elapsed time 
(GET) and ended at 228:03:00 GET (15.3 hours of audio). 
Apollo 16 EVA 4’s main objectives were to retrieve film 
cassettes from external storage compartments on the 
command module and conduct the Microbial Ecology 
Evaluation Device (MEED) experiment [25]. The EVA, 
from hatch open to hatch close, lasted 59.7 minutes and 
serves as the only deep space human EVA ever conducted 
that was not performed on the moon. The EVA operators 
within the transcript, described in Table II, consisted of 
the crewmembers and MCC CAPCOM. Ken Mattingly 
performed the EVA while John Young and Charlie Duke 
fulfilled the roles of IV. Henry Hartsfield filled the 
CAPCOM position until the completion of the EVA at 
which point Don Peterson took over the voice loop.  
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Each instance of communication was examined using an 
adapted coding scheme previously used in Ref. [26], 
which examined communication patterns between 
members onboard a flight deck. Table II shows the coding 
structure delineated by operators, communication 
pathway, and communication content. Instances of 
communication loss and operator confusion were also 
coded. The destination of each communication instance 
by each operator was determined and classified into crew-
to-crew, crew-to-ground, and ground-to-crew pathways. 
The pathways were further examined for their content to 
reveal the demands and information needs of each 
operator. To assess the reliability of the coding, the 
transcript was coded from suit donning (216:44:41 GET) 
to equipment stowage (220:26:22 GET) by two judges. 
Percent agreement between the judges was 91%. 
Discrepancies in codes were discussed between the judges 
until consensus was reached.  
Table II. Apollo 16 EVA 4 Transcript Coding Scheme 
Type Codes Description 
EVA 
Operators 
MCC CAPCOM Henry Hartsfield & Don Peterson 
Commander (IV) John W. Young 
Command Module 
Pilot (EV) Thomas K. (Ken) Mattingly II 
Lunar Module Pilot 
(IV) Charles (Charlie) M. Duke, Jr. 
Comm. 
Pathway 
GtoC ground to crew communication instance 
CtoC crew to crew communication instance 
CtoG crew to ground communication instance 
Comm. 
Content 
Query questions asking 'What', 'When', 'Where' --e.g. "Do you know…" 
Query Response response solely focused on the question asked 
Request request of an action or information transfer 
Request Response response to request of an action or information transfer 
Clarification additional information provided beyond the initial query response 
Reminder information provided (either prompted or unprompted) 
Update unprompted conveyance of information 
Acknowledge ensures information was received  -- e.g. "roger" or "okay" 
Comm. Issues 
or Confusion 
Comm. Loss evidence of communication loss (having to repeat statements) 
Garble incomprehensible phrase ('garble') 
Crew Confusion evidence of crew confusion  -- e.g. "huh?.." 
Ground Confusion evidence of ground confusion  -- e.g. "huh?.." 
 
4.  HUMAN EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY  
The general purpose of EVA is to enhance the ability of 
the crewmembers to achieve mission success. As life 
support technology increased in reliability throughout the 
past 50 years, the confidence to pursue more complex 
EVA objectives also increased. EVA has become a 
workhorse for the NASA human space program in many 
duties because of astronauts’ abilities to respond to 
unexpected failures and contingencies in real-time. Table 
III highlights some of the capabilities demonstrated by 
EVA to-date. The reader is encouraged to refer to Refs. 
[2], [3] for review of past EVA accomplishments and 
lessons learned. Much of the demonstrated capabilities of 
EVA will be needed to achieve mission success on future 
NASA missions. 
In general, EVAs can be classified into three categories: 
scheduled, unscheduled and contingency [27]. The vast 
majority of EVAs performed to-date have been scheduled 
EVAs meaning the EVA was planned and practiced on 
the ground by all relevant personnel long before being 
performed in space. Scheduled EVAs have a dedicated 
planning period on the order of one year prior to astronaut 
egress, but can vary depending on EVA objectives. An 
unscheduled EVA is defined as an unplanned event that is  
considered essential to ensure mission success. While 
unplanned, an unscheduled EVA still receives a fair 
amount of timeline development and mission planning. 
The shortest duration planning period for an unscheduled 
EVA was 36 hours for EVA 21 which was recently 
performed on the ISS. Contingency EVA refers to an 
EVA that is safety critical to the crew. NASA currently 
has identified 12 main contingency EVAs which have 
procedures in place. To-date, none of those contingency 
EVAs have been performed during flight. It is also 
important to note that in addition to training for scheduled 
EVAs, crews also participate in training exercises to 
prepare for possible unscheduled and contingency EVA 
tasks. 
Table III. EVA Purposes and Demonstration Flights [28] 
Purpose Reference Mission(s) Date (Yr) 
Technology 
Demonstration Gemini 4, 10-12 1965;'66 
Spacecraft and 
Payload Inspection 
STS-37 (EVA 6); 
STS-50 (EVA 6) 1991;'92 
Spacecraft Servicing STS-114 (EVA 3) 2005 
Payload Repair STS-61 (EVA 23-27) 1993 
Payload Deployment STS-37 (EVA 14); Apollo 16 (EVA 10) 1991;'72 
Scientific 
Experimentation & 
Testing 
Apollo 16 (EVA 4); 
Skylab (EVA 10) 1972;'74 
Device Installation Skylab (EVA 4);  ISS (EVA 79) 1973;'96 
Structure 
Construction  & 
Assembly 
STS-61 (EVA 12-13) 1993 
EVAs themselves can be decomposed into three primary 
phases: pre-EVA, EVA, and post-EVA. Pre-EVA tasks 
include all the preparatory work necessary to get both 
crew and systems ready for the EVA. The EVA phase 
consists of the execution of the EVA timeline while the 
airlock hatch is open. These activities include translating 
to the worksite, preparing the worksite for activity, 
performing the desired task(s), cleaning-up the worksite 
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and translating back to the airlock for ingress. NASA 
defines an EVA as when the Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
(EMU) life support is separated from the spacecraft life 
support system. However, this study defines the hatch 
open and close actions to delineate the start and end of the 
EVA because this action is more readily identifiable 
within the available data sources (i.e. EVA transcripts, 
and video/audio files). Once back inside the spacecraft, 
the astronauts must doff the space suit, perform 
maintenance on the EMU and tools, and properly stow all 
equipment. Figure 1 below shows a representative EVA 
timeline breakdown by EVA phase and associated tasks. 
Figure 1 is meant to convey a notional nominal timeline 
that shows the various activities that are completed during 
an EVA. In order for these tasks to be accomplished, an 
entire support team works in tandem with the astronauts. 
These support personnel and the manner in which they 
provide support for the execution of these notional 
activities is the remaining topic of this section. 
EVA Phase 
Timeline 
(Hr:Min) Activity 
Pre-EVA 
-5:00+ - Crew rebreathe protocols  
 - Airlock preparations & depress 
 - EMU check-out & assembly 
 - Tool prep 
EVA 
0:00 Crew Egress 
 Translation to worksite 1:00 
 Worksite setup 2:00 
 
Perform worksite task(s) 
3:00 
 4:00 
 5:00 Worksite cleanup 
 Translation to airlock 6:00 
 Crew Ingress 
Post EVA 
7:00+ - Airlock repress & cleanup 
 - Tool evaluation & breakdown 
 - EMU doffing & maintenance 
 
- Equipment stowage 
- Crew Debriefs 
   
Figure 1. Notional EVA timeline with 
representative tasks. 
 
During real-time operations, an EVA can be described as 
operating within two modes: nominal or off-nominal. 
Nominal indicates that all tasks are proceeding without 
any issues and that the procedures and systems are 
adhering to the planned timeline. Off-nominal situations 
represent any instances that deviate from the nominal 
timeline. Figure 2 shows a comparison between nominal 
and off-nominal timeline margin as a function of location 
within a representative EVA timeline. To assist the EVA 
operator in both modes of operation, a document known 
as a crib sheet is produced. This document provides task 
instructions and suggestions for nominal operations and 
also includes information for contingencies that may arise 
during the EVA. EVA operators develop a crib sheet that 
addresses as many situations as possible that could arise 
during the EVA, e.g. equipment failure, unexpected 
worksite configuration, etc. The crib sheet document 
contains vetted task procedures to ameliorate off-nominal 
situations, which could possibly impact the timeline 
positively or negatively. 
 
Figure 2. EVA Modes of Operation 
 
Timeline margin, as shown in Figure 2, refers to the 
capacity for the EVA to complete a predefined set of tasks 
within an allocated amount of time. The crib sheet region 
represents the limitations imposed on the EVA due to 
finite training preparation and EVA resources. The crew 
can only train for a finite set of possible tasks and the 
EVA resources, such as the crib sheet, can only account 
for a limited set of possible scenarios.  Outside this region 
exists the unpredicted region, where situations are 
unfamiliar and potentially life threatening.  
Positive timeline margin indicates more tasks can be 
completed than planned, thus the timeline can be ahead of 
schedule. These tasks are usually called “get ahead” tasks 
and are planned, just in case positive margin in the 
timeline arises. EVA timelines are constructed today with 
an a priori knowledge that on orbit task performance is 
usually more efficient than on ground training 
performance, due to the absence of drag forces present in 
simulation environments such as the Neutral Buoyance 
Lab (NBL), which results in positive timeline margin 
[29]. Negative timeline margin means less tasks can be 
completed than originally planned, thus the timeline can 
fall behind schedule. This situation can arise for a variety 
of reasons including but not limited to hardware 
malfunctions and EV crew translation difficulties.     
The best and worst case modes of operation represent 
idealized limits as to how much ahead and how far behind 
the EVA timeline progression can become. For instance, 
the worst-case timeline would result in no planned tasks 
being accomplished. The best-case timeline would mean 
that more tasks than even the preplanned “get ahead” 
tasks were accomplished. 
Nominal Operations 
During the nominal mode of operation, the 
communication chatter on the air-to-ground link is kept at 
a minimum. The nominal mode during EVA is analogous 
to the “Quiet or Dark Cockpit” nominal operations mode 
of Boeing aircraft {Stoll}. Timeline procedures are 
relayed via the IV crewmember and status updates and 
EVA	  Ti
meline
	  Margin
 
(+)  
(-)  
Worst Case 
 
Crib Sheet Region 
Nominal 
Behind 
Ahead 
 
 
Best Case 
Unpredicted Region 
Unpredicted Region 
Timeline progression in 
time → 
Start End 
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confirmations are sent by the EVA crewmembers as 
needed. There are periodic status updates sent between 
the EVA MCC operators. The crib sheet, utilized in the 
nominal mode of operation, serves as a quick reference 
for helpful hints and instructions to keep deviations from 
the nominal timeline at a minimum. 
Off-Nominal Operations 
The nominal timeline includes the “must-have” tasks. To 
help ensure these tasks are accomplished, the crib sheet is 
usually weighted to account for more negative off-
nominal situations. The amount of communication 
between EVA operators usually increases with the 
number of the off-nominal events. Also, the more life 
threatening the situation, the more people become 
involved. In extreme cases additional personnel known as 
Team 4 are called in to troubleshoot with MCC personnel.  
Their involvement is beyond the scope of this study.   
A great deal of time and effort is devoted to crib sheet 
development. But even with years of experience and 
planning there is always the element of unknown when 
operating an EVA. As a testament to the members of the 
EVA community, no loss of life situations have occurred 
during EVA, to-date. However, 36% of all EVAs 
performed until July 2011 have experienced a significant 
incident of some kind (e.g. systems issues, operational 
failures, etc.) as defined by the NASA Flight Safety 
Office [1]. 
5. EVA INFORMATION FLOW MODEL 
The results presented in this section are a synthesis of 
information from the various data sources described in 
Section 2. First, primary and secondary operators’ roles 
and responsibilities are discussed. Then, an information 
flow model of the EVA domain is presented highlighting 
the communication pathways between EVA operators as 
shown in Figure 3. 
EVA Operators 
This study classifies EVA operators into two groups: 
primary operators are those personnel who are directly 
involved with the real-time EVA timeline execution and 
crew safety, and secondary operators are those personnel 
that provide support to the primary operators. All 
personnel are tasked with the responsibility of 
maintaining crew safety. The distinction made here 
between the operators is to help breakdown the work 
domain for discussion purposes. 
Primary operators consist of the crewmembers 
(Extravehicular (EV), and intravehicular (IV)), and MCC 
personnel (the Flight Director, the Capsule Communicator 
(CAPCOM), the EVA Flight Control Room (FCR) 
personnel, and the EVA Multi-Purpose Support Room 
(MPSR) personnel). 
Astronauts fulfill the role of the EVA crewmembers and 
typically serve as the IV crewmember and/or CAPCOM. 
Current day operations of EVA invoke a buddy system 
where the lead EVA crewmember (EV1) and his/her 
partner (EV2) work collaboratively to achieve the EVA 
objectives. The EVA crewmembers are the actuators 
within the EVA domain, physically manipulating the 
external environment around the spacecraft. They are 
tasked with properly executing the EVA timeline in an 
efficient and safe manner. Their work environment is 
constrained by their EMU, their worksite and their 
physical and mental capabilities (see Refs [30], [31] for 
detailed descriptions of EVA work environment). 
At the top of the MCC hierarchy is the Flight Director 
whose ultimate role is to act as the governing authority to 
maintain crew safety and ensure overall mission success. 
The Flight Director has final authority over all decisions 
that are made during the entire mission, not just during 
the EVA. This operator must manage the decisions 
governing the entire human/spacecraft system. 
CAPCOM is the only person, along with the IV, in the 
MCC allowed to verbally communicate directly with the 
crew. They serve as the focal point of the information 
generated within MCC and the information coming from 
the crew.  
The IV crewmember is the EVA field marshal, dictating 
the pace and productivity of the EVA by verbal 
communication with the EV crew and MCC. ISS 
operations incorporate a ground IV whereas past 
programs such as the shuttle program placed the IV 
crewmember onboard the spacecraft. In either case, they 
closely monitor EVA progress with the intent of 
minimizing error in task performance. They control the 
EVA checklists and procedures and manage the 
integration of all communication flow between the EVA 
crewmembers and MCC personnel. They are also heavily 
involved in the pre-EVA procedures as well as the post-
EVA tasks, ensuring all procedures and checklists are 
properly completed. 
The EVA FCR is the lead EVA team member in MCC 
who is responsible for coordinating all EVA activity in 
the MCC, which includes maintaining accurate console 
logs, tracking the positive/negative timeline margin based 
on the planned timeline, reporting anomalies, assessing 
the impact of those anomalies on EVA operations, and 
recommending appropriate action to the Flight Director. 
This operator leads the EVA team on all aspects of the 
EVA from pre to post EVA tasks and interfaces with 
pertinent MCC FCR personnel as needed. They are also 
responsible for the development of the EVA checklists 
and procedures.  
To support the tasks and responsibilities of the EVA FCR, 
there exist three positions within the MPSR known as 
EVA Task, EMU Systems, and Airlock Systems. These 
operators are the handlers of the raw data sent from the 
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crew and spacecraft to MCC. It is common to have one or 
more support personnel such as those doing on the job 
training sit along these MPSR operators to assist them in 
their duties. 
The EVA Task primary role is to monitor and manage the 
progression of the EVA tasks within the timeline. This 
MCC position is the EVA expert for all task procedures 
and responds to any task anomalies or problems that may 
arise during the EVA. EVA Task handles the execution of 
task workarounds and coordinates procedural updates 
with the rest of the EVA support team. EVA Task is also 
tasked with the responsibility of tracking tool usage and 
stowage. Their primary data sources are audio and video 
downlink to track EVA progression. 
The responsibility of the EMU system rests with the EMU 
Systems operator, who handles all system monitoring, 
configuring, and troubleshooting that may arise during the 
EVA. EMU Systems also provides EMU system updates 
such as consumable status to the rest EVA support team, 
and assesses the impact of the EMU on the EVA timeline 
and assists in monitoring crew health. EMU Systems is 
the primary tracker of the crew’s limited consumables 
(i.e. O2, CO2, power, etc.) and reporter of crew status to 
the rest of the EVA Operators. Their main data sources in 
addition to the audio and video downlink is the EMU suit 
telemetry. 
During the pre-EVA and post-EVA, an Airlock Systems 
operator manages tasks related to airlock operations. 
Responsibilities include aiding in some EMU system 
monitoring alongside the EMU Systems operator, but 
mainly coordinating EVA tasks that interface with airlock 
systems. Also, the Airlock Systems operator assesses 
timeline alterations with airlock considerations and 
provides recommendations and workarounds to the rest of 
the EVA support team. Airlock Systems leverages the 
telemetry data as well as the audio and video data to 
monitor and maintain understanding of the vehicle 
systems as it pertains to EVA interfaces. 
The remainders of the EVA support staff are classified as 
secondary operators, which consist of a multitude of 
personnel, more than there is room for in this one study to 
discuss in detail. In summary, secondary operators 
provide supplementary information and support to the 
primary operators pertaining specifically to EVA. These 
operators include, but are not limited to, flight controller 
consoles such as the Flight Surgeon, the Environment 
Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS), Operations 
Support Officer (OSO), Robotics Operations Systems 
Officer (ROBO) and Communications and Tracking 
Officer (CATO) in MCC FCR. The examination of all 
FCR console positions is outside the scope of this study 
but the reader is encouraged to consult Ref. [32] for 
further detail of MCC operations. Each MCC FCR 
operator has MPSR consoles that provide additional 
support and analysis capability. In addition to these 
personnel, there exists another layer of support that 
includes Mission Evaluation Room (MER) operators and 
SAFETY. These positions provide the “nuts and bolts” 
systems knowledge to the rest of the support team. 
Additional operators also include all the support facilities 
staff who were involved with the EVA tool development, 
testing, and training of the EVA crew. Examples of such 
facilities include the Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL) and 
Virtual Reality Lab. An overview of these facilities and 
more can be found in Ref. [33]. 
EVA Information Flow Model 
With the primary and secondary operators in mind, the 
communication pathways between each can be examined, 
and summarized in an information flow model in Figure 
3. The information flow model provides a framework to 
describe the information transfer during EVA support and 
identifies areas of potential disturbances in 
communication transfer. 
Each of the primary operators within MCC are 
represented by ovals and the secondary operators are 
grouped together within relevant support groups. MCC 
artifacts, which are uniform throughout all the console 
positions are also provided. Arrows are used to display 
the primary linkages and modes of communication 
between each console position during a nominal EVA 
operations. Each shaded region displays the relative 
proximity between each operator. For example, the MCC 
FCR operators are all co-located in the same room which 
allows for verbal and nonverbal communication in 
addition to the voice loops and console systems. 
Disturbances in communication are indicated by 
lightening bolts.  
The highest priority communication pathway is the air-to-
ground transmissions, which all operators listen to at all 
times. But only a select few operators (the crew members, 
ground IV and CAPCOM) can speak on this voice loop. 
The information flow exhibits a top down hierarchy with 
information flowing down from the in-space crew to the 
various support teams. Each operator utilizes a multitude 
of data sources, but specifically uses electronic flight 
notes (EFNs), mission action requests (CHITs), JEDI 
messages, the Anomaly database, electronic crew timeline 
(OSTPV), and change requests (CR) data entry systems 
for real-time data processing and transfer. Each position is 
also responsible for accurately logging their activities 
within their electronic console logs. In addition to their 
electronic resources, each console position has copies of 
the MCC flight rules and console specific handbooks. 
Both these documents are an assimilation of best practices 
and guidance expected to be implemented during support 
operations. 
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Figure 3. EVA Information Flow Model 
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The MPSR operators handle and analyze the raw data 
which consists of audio, video, text and telemetry. They 
then pass along their interpretations and recommendations 
to the MCC FCR personnel. Within the MCC FCR, the 
information then flows through the Flight Director. The 
Flight Director interacts directly with the EVA FCR for 
EVA related activity, and also maintains contact across all 
the other FCR consoles to maintain system wide 
understanding. The information from EVA FCR is passed 
to the ground IV and/or CAPCOM depending on the 
relevancy of the information. Non-EVA related systems 
knowledge is primarily channeled via the CAPCOM and 
EVA relevant information is transmitted via the ground 
IV. Personnel preference dictates whether the information 
is verbally re-communicated by the Flight Director to 
CAPCOM or ground IV, or rather simply agreed upon by 
verbal or nonverbal communication. There also exists a 
communication channel between the Flight Director, 
Ground IV, and EVA FCR that occurs face to face and is 
not over the voice loops. 
Another area of important communication traffic is 
between the EVA FCR and the EVA MPSR, who are 
located in separate control rooms (same building). They 
rely on the voice loops and console data entry systems as 
a means to transmit their knowledge of the EVA systems 
and timeline progress. The EVA FCR is concerned with 
integrating the various aspects of the EVA such as 
timeline and EMU consumables, and relies on EVA Task 
and EVA Systems to provide that material, respectively.  
To aid in their monitoring and anomaly resolution 
capabilities, the EVA MPSRs rely on input from the 
various MPSR support operators. The Mission Evaluation 
Room (MER) is an important source of data for the EVA 
MPSR operators. The EVA MER operators in particular 
convey the necessary technical details of the tools and 
equipment needed by the MPSR and FCR personnel and 
provide an additional level of system monitoring, fault 
detection, and anomaly resolution.  
Disturbances in communication among the EVA 
operators can occur, even in the most ideal nominal real-
time situations. The air-to-ground transmission can 
experience loss of signal events, indicated by lightning 
bolts 1, 2, and 3, which prevent communication and data 
transfer. Video data is lost more frequently than audio 
data, which impairs MCC situation awareness. These 
events typically have a duration on the order of a few 
seconds to tens of minutes. During this time, the 
crewmembers and MCC are forced to work in an isolated 
fashion relying on the EVA timeline, checklist, and 
personal experience until communication can be 
reestablished. In addition to loss of signal disturbances, 
EVA crewmembers have suffered from periods of tunnel 
vision which impairs their ability to maintain their spatial 
and mental awareness which is compensated by close 
monitoring by MCC. Finally, communication between the 
all operators is complicated by the desire not to interrupt 
each other. There is a lot of information that must be 
channeled between the operators in a succinct and 
efficient manner as possible. 
Two other disturbances exist which are identified by 
lightning bolt 2 and 3. They include EVA timeline 
alterations and spacecraft updates. EVA replanning 
requires the ground IV to adequately relay that 
information to the crewmember for implementation. Poor 
communication, and lack of specific knowledge can lead 
to improper task execution. From a spacecraft 
perspective, CAPCOM must perform similar duties in 
ensuring the spacecraft systems are updated to the 
necessary configurations to aid in EVA execution (i.e. 
ensure the electrical system is turned off and on when a 
module is replaced by a crewmember). Common practice 
in performing real-time EVA modifications is to send a 
preliminary outline of the changes to the crewmembers, to 
let the give feedback. However, if changes are made 
during the EVA phase, replanning instructions are 
primarily restricted to audio communication with limited 
time for discussion of the changes due to time constraints. 
Communication disturbances are also present between the 
MCC operators as highlighted in lightning bolts 4 and 5. 
The EVA FCR is concerned with “big picture” items such 
as overall timeline execution and EVA integration with 
other spacecraft subsystems where as the MPSR operators 
are concerned with the minute by minute details. In 
particular, the MPSR operators are constantly monitoring 
real-time flight data and comparing that information with 
their own expected values (trend monitoring). Data trends 
either follow what they expect or they deviate; but in 
either case, MPSR operators must inform the EVA FCR 
of their status. The threat of information overload and of 
inadequate knowledge transfer between these operators 
are ever present. As indicated by lightening bolt 5, there 
also exists the threat of over reliance on the MPSR 
support teams such as MER by the MPSR and MCC. This 
additional layer of EVA support also introduces 
additional opportunities for poor communication and 
inadequate coordination. 
Additional considerations exists that are not limited 
strictly to the EVA support operators. The MCC has a 
structured authorization process, where the Flight 
Director has final authority on transmissions sent to the 
crewmembers. Even already preapproved EVA 
procedures, such as those on the EVA crib sheet, must 
pass through the proper channel for authorization in real-
time. Additionally, there are many voice loops running 
concurrently that must be synthesized by many operators. 
The risks of task saturation and information overload 
were repeatedly mentioned during the interviews as 
commonplace among most operators during real-time 
operations.  
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6. APOLLO 16 EVA 4 COMMUNICATION 
ANALYSIS  
The results presented in this section are an analysis of an 
actual EVA voice transcript. Future EVAs, which take 
place beyond LEO, present a unique operational challenge 
and is the motivation for this work.  To that end, a 
communication analysis was conducted of the only non-
terrestrial “deep space” EVA to be conducted by NASA, 
Apollo 16 EVA 4 that is indicative of a nominal EVA. 
This work highlights the communication pathways 
between EVA operators and the content of those 
communication instances. 
First, the communication pathways are described, and 
then the content results are presented. The crewmembers 
generated 75 percent of all instances of communication 
and the MCC supplied the remaining 25 percent. Figure 4 
shows the volume of communication transfer for crew to 
crew and crew to ground pathways for each crewmember.  
 
Figure 4. Total onboard crew communication between 
other crewmembers and ground crew. 
 
Duke and Young provided Intravehicular Activity support 
while Mattingly conducted the EVA. Young’s IV support 
was involved specifically in meeting Mattingly’s needs 
whereas Duke focused his work more on the vehicle 
systems. Duke and Mattingly spent approximately 55 to 
60 percent of their time conversing with the onboard 
crew, whereas Young spent 71% of his communication 
with the onboard crew. As for CAPCOM, Figure 5 shows 
their communication instances were clustered towards the 
pre and post EVA phases. CAPCOM utilized only 7% of 
their total communication instances during the EVA. 
 
Figure 5. Ground crew communication sent to 
onboard crew during all phases of EVA. 
 
The communication pathways were then divided among 
the three separate EVA phases for each of the onboard 
crewmembers. Figure 6 show the percentage breakdowns 
for the pre-EVA, EVA, and post-EVA phases, 
respectively. The pre-EVA phase exhibited 50%-60% 
crew-to-crew communication. These conversations 
pertained primarily to vehicle configuration topics and 
timeline status updates. Throughout the transcript there 
were periods where voice communication was used to 
realign MCC and crewmembers as to their progression 
within the timeline. Paper checklists and procedures were 
leveraged for almost all activities. When the timeline 
entered the EVA phase, communication patterns shifted to 
crew-to-crew instances. Mattingly utilized voice 
communication as a means to continually update the team 
on his progress and status. Several instances of him 
thinking aloud were displayed.  
Note that even though the communication was 
predominately crew-to-crew communication, the ground 
was a passive listener in all communication instances, 
participating in the conversation during periods of high 
importance such as the MEED experiment. Once the EVA 
was completed, the majority of the conversations once 
again shifted, except crew-to-ground communication 
became the dominant pathway. This trend can be 
attributed mostly to the debriefing and vehicle 
configuration conversations that occurred post EVA. 
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Figure 6. Onboard crew communication between other crewmembers and ground crew during Pre-EVA, EVA, and 
Post-EVA activities. 
As previously shown in Figure 6, the dominant 
communication pathway varies depending on the various 
stage of the EVA timeline. This trend is also reflected in 
Table IV, which shows the communication instance 
frequencies within each EVA phase. Crew/Ground pathways 
maintain a steady rate of approximately one instance per 
minute, peaking at about three instances per minute during 
the EVA, whereas the crew/crew interaction increases ten-
fold during the EVA phase. This can be primarily attributed 
to the increased rate of status updates made by the EV 
crewmember as he conducted his activities outside the 
spacecraft.  
Table IV. Communication instance frequencies 
(instance/min). 
  Pre-EVA EVA Post-EVA 
Crew/Crew  0.68 11.38 0.26 
Crew/Ground 1.3 3.53 1.03 
Total Comm.  1.99 14.92 1.29 
Figure 7 shows a more detailed time-elapsed evolution of the 
communication instances among the operators. Crew/crew 
communication instances are shown alongside crew/ground 
instances with major EVA timeline milestones such as suit 
donning and hatch opening and closing. The shaded region 
that includes suit donning to the start of equipment stowage 
identifies the region where the communication content 
analysis was applied, as described in Table II.An almost 
constant rate of communication is shown in  between the 
two CAPCOM personnel even during regions of increased 
crew/crew communication. As expected, the EV 
crewmember displayed the greatest number of 
communication instances. Areas of increased 
communication occurred during major events in the EVA 
timeline such as suit donning, cabin depress, and hatch 
operations. MCC maintained close communication pathways 
with each of the major timeline events. One area that 
displays a sharp increase in communication rates is during 
the MEED experiment, which required a precise timing of 
sample exposure. IV communication patterns also provide 
some insight into the delineation of their IV responsibilities. 
Young displayed a communication pattern that more closely 
mirrors Mattingly indicating that his role was geared 
towards immediate EVA support. Young verbally conducted 
the pre-EVA checklist and ensured the suits were donned 
appropriately. Duke maintained a more indirect support role 
during the EVA by maintaining onboard systems and 
interacting with MCC predominately during post-EVA.  
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Figure 7. EVA operators' communication instances as a function of time.  
The shaded region of  was examined in more detail for the 
content of the communication instances. The content 
breakdown for each operator is shown in Figure 8. Note that 
the individual percentages of each operator when summed 
together do not total 100% because for many of the 
instances, multiple codes were applicable. For example, 
during Mattingly’s inspection of hardware during EVA he 
said to MCC: 
(219:06:17 GET) “Okay, anything else on the aft end? I don’t 
see any blistering of paint or anything. It’s all 
clean in the aft shell.” 
The first portion of Mattingly’s instance indicated an 
acknowledgement to CAPCOM’s pervious communication 
instance as well as a query. He then provides additional 
clarification to supplement his query. Many of the 
overlapping codes (10 < instances < 20) occurred in pairs 
such as Query/Request Response, Query/Clarification, 
Query/Update, Query Response/Clarification,   
Update/Clarification, and Request/Update. The 
Acknowledge code was almost universally paired with 
another code, particularly with Query and Request (over 60 
occurrences). 
Each operator displayed a consistent pattern in 
acknowledging communication transmissions. This is likely 
attributed to standard etiquette present in military radio 
speech. CAPCOM in particular made sure to acknowledge 
proper transmission and understanding from the crew. 
CAPCOM also spent 26% of their communication instances 
responding to questions the crewmembers asked. A subtle 
yet important role CAPCOM played was with regards to 
providing reminders for the crewmembers. On multiple 
occasions, the crew utilized CAPCOM as an external timer 
and procedure reminder. The crewmembers off-loaded 
memory related information to CAPCOM, which was then 
returned at the desired time in the timeline. An example of 
this is shown below where Young requested MCC to remind 
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the crew to close a valve when a particular pressure value 
was reached. 
(218:38:41 GET) “Okay. Houston, can you give us a call at 
3.25?” 
(218:38:45 GET) “Will do.” 
Out of the crewmembers, Duke spent more time responding 
to questions and requests. Young spent a large portion of his 
communication instances making requests and asking 
questions. Young’s communication content aligns with his 
role as the primary IV support to Mattingly, especially in the 
pre-EVA and EVA phases. Mattingly spent much of his time 
updating the rest of the operators of his precise location 
within the EVA timeline as well as asking questions. He 
provided details such as particular details in handling of the 
equipment and current equipment configurations to ensure 
proper EVA execution. 
  
Figure 8. EVA operators' communication content 
breakdown 
7. DISCUSSION 
Present-day EVA support structure is arranged to meet the 
needs of ISS operations. As highlighted in the information 
flow, the ground IV is located in MCC instead of on station. 
Two primary reasons exist for this configuration, the first 
being that there are typically only three American astronauts 
onboard the ISS at one time. Two of these people are 
dedicated to conducting the EVA and the third person is 
usually dedicated to operating the ISS robotic arm to support 
the EVA (e.g. relocate cargo and equipment), leaving no one 
available to perform IV tasks onboard. The second reason is 
that the EVAs being conducted are typically not recently 
rehearsed before performing due to the long duration 
spaceflight times (upwards of 6 months). Any changes made 
to the EVA timeline are better understood by a ground IV 
who participated in the development of those changes. They 
can then translate those changes to the onboard crew. This 
work flow leads to a high level of adaptability for current 
ISS EVAs. The crew train for their planned EVAs but if 
timelines change, at least one of the immediate 
crewmembers (the ground IV) is well acquainted with the 
changes. This configuration is in contrast to the shuttle 
missions where EVA efficiency was more important than 
adaptability since the shuttle missions had a limited mission 
duration typically less than 14 days. Every minute mattered 
which meant that an onboard crew member or two was 
dedicated to ensuring the IV roles and responsibilities were 
met. The Shuttle approach to EVAs, however, required an 
incredible amount of preplanning and the time between 
training and actually performing the EVA was kept to a 
minimum. 
In the context of future deep space, time–delayed 
communication missions with length mission durations, it is 
likely that the reemergence of dedicated onboard IV 
crewmembers will occur, similar to the two-IV configuration 
seen in Apollo 16 EVA 4. In fact, the design of Orion will 
not be that dissimilar from the Apollo capsule. Just like the 
crew in Apollo 16 EVA 4, all crew members will have to 
don their spacesuits and depress the cabin for EVA 
capability. However, the element of adaptability will also be 
present given the lengthy mission timelines. Ensuring both 
adaptability as well as efficiency in the presence of time-
delay will stress the current EVA support structure. Results 
from analog missions have shown that multiple IV onboard 
crewmembers help alleviate this stress [34], however, the 
specific reasons for this trend remains largely unanswered.  
The information flow model shows that EVA support is a 
complex work domain. While the astronauts assume the 
greatest personal risk in conducting the spacewalk, it is up to 
the rest of the team to minimize that risk by ensuring that the 
EVA crewmembers’ environment, systems, and tools are 
operational and safe. The vast amount of domain knowledge 
that exists within MCC is unlikely to be transferred 
completely onboard in the near future via automated systems 
due to technological limitations. Future missions will still 
require significant human support input into the EVA work 
domain, and the role of advanced technology in this time-
delayed environment is yet to be determined. Transferring at 
least some  aspects of MCC real-time support capabilities 
onboard could alleviate some of the time-delay 
communication challenges between crew and ground. The 
proper function allocation between MCC and onboard 
automated systems for EVA support is another open ended 
topic. Crew training and planning will also likely play a key 
role in alleviating some of the time delay challenges. 
It is important to consider all aspects of an EVA, including 
pre and post EVA activities. As seen in the Apollo EVA, the 
dialog between crew and ground is elevated during pre and 
post EVA activities. Even during the EVA, where ground 
communication frequencies were found to be 3 instances per 
minute, time-delay of even tens of seconds will have an 
immediate impact. To-date, analog studies such as the RATS 
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and NEEMO missions have had some success at 
demonstrating nominal EVA operations by incorporating the 
time-delay into the EVA planning. However, the NASA 
AMO study, has demonstrated the coordination capability 
between crew and ground can break down in the presence of 
time-delay under current operating practices, even with 
rudimentary mitigation tools. The majority of 
communication instances of between crew and ground 
operators in the case study pertained to queries, requests and 
their associated responses which indicates the inherent 
reliance each EVA operators has on one another. Finding 
alternative methods, possibility via technological means, to 
answering these queries and requests will prove useful in 
operating in time-delay. 
Limitations of study 
The applicability of the findings in this study require some 
discussion. The information flow model was constructed via 
a limited set of meetings and interviews with EVA domain 
experts with varying degrees of experience. The limited 
number of EVAs conducted per year prevented an actual 
observation of an EVA during the course of this study which 
limited the resolution of the details within the flow model. 
As for the communication analysis of the Apollo 16 EVA 4, 
the technologies utlized during this EVA are out of date 
compared to present day standards but it does provide some 
insight as to how a crew can execute an EVA with limited 
ground dialog. The EVA itself was fairly simple in 
complexity and the duration was a fraction of the EVA 
durations conducted today. The purpose of the EVA was to 
execute a science objective, which is a likely objective in 
future EVA missions. 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This work sought to explore the EVA domain, given the lack 
of formal explanations in the literature. Contextual inquiry 
was leveraged, specifically an information flow model was 
constructed, to explain the key operators and their respective 
roles. This model identifies the complex communication 
pathways that exist to provide real-time support to EVA 
crewmembers and disturbances to those communication 
pathways. The EVA domain was shown to be a dynamic 
environment in which there exists much interaction within 
MCC to support the EVA crewmembers. MCC provides 
vital contributions to the execution of the EVA such as 
consumable tracking, and anomaly resolution.  
A communication analysis of an historical flight transcript 
was also conducted to provide further context of the EVA 
domain, as it pertains to operations beyond LEO. The 
communication pathways were quantified and a content 
analysis was performed to gain a understanding of the 
operator needs and demands. Some key results of this work 
is that a majority of communication instances are devoted to 
asking and responding to questions and  requests. MCC 
performs a wide array of roles ranging from answering 
questions to acting as a reminder to requesting tasks to be 
completed. Future work should attempt to leverage not only 
Apollo EVAs but also Shuttle and ISS flight data to gain 
additional insight into EVA operations.  
Extending the current EVA support configuration to future 
time-delayed missions raises areas of future research. There 
is a need to better understand the nominal and off-nominal 
modes of operation in time-delay scenarios from a MCC 
perspective. Also, future EVAs will likely have additional 
EVA operators such as scientists involved in EVA 
exploration which is different from current day operations.  
How will the vast knowledge that exists with MCC be 
appropriately conveyed to EVA crew when needed? This 
question emphasizes the need for further research into 
current day operations for insight into future operations. 
Appropriate function allocation of MCC capabilities split 
between human and automated systems is an immediate area 
of potential research. The EVA domain is ripe with potential 
as an area of research for future decision support system 
technology to alleviate the time-delay impacts on EVA 
operations. 
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Hi Dave, Below are my responses (in red). I can’t thank you enough for providing this level of feedback. I really 
appreciate your insight to help make this paper as informative as possible. 
[1] Section 1:  In Table I, I know the distances of NEOs vary quite a bit, but it would be good to have a close 
and far example distance for the types of missions we’ve been looking at.  Of course, getting those numbers 
is easier said than done. 
a. I honestly haven’t found any good credible sources that have given me this sort of data. I have 
cited what I’ve found to be the most recent descriptions of an asteroid redirect mission but even 
they don’t give distances… 
[2] Section 1, 3rd paragraph:  Why use Apollo 16 EVA 4 as a case study? 
a. This EVA was chosen because it was 1) the EVA was performed outside of LEO, but not on the 
moon, so I’m saying it loosely resembles what an asteroid redirect class mission should look like 
and 2) it was a relatively shorter mission so as the data analysis could be line by line on the 
transcript (Corrections made in Paper) 
[3] Section 2, 2nd paragraph:  Are you going to include the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) engineering 
support also?  
a. I decided that including MER would have been too much for this one conference paper. Future 
studies probably could and should include MER, my resources at the time were limited on MER 
which is also why I decided to only briefly mention that MER exists. 
[4] Section 2, 4th paragraph:  Keep in mind that the crew and MCC had minimal (if any) training, which 
contributed to the breakdown of comm over the 5 and 10 min delays.  
a. Yes, after talking with some other people who mentioned that as well, I will reword this section, 
noting that point. PUT IN DISCUSSION SECTION 
[5] Section 2, 5th paragraph:  RATS 2012 showed the importance of a dedicated IV crewmember, but that’s not 
a new lesson learned.  We either have a dedicated onboard IV (usually during shuttle flights) or a dedicated 
ground IV for current operations.  RATS 2012 showed us that we need to continue with having an IV in a 
real-time loop, which means having that IV with the crew and not on in MCC. 
a. Thank you for that clarification, I’ll reword my phrasing here. (Corrections made in Paper)  
[6] Section 2, 6th paragraph:  You did point out that AMO didn’t do EVAs, but you’ll need to be careful about 
comparing anything they did in an IVA environment with how things might be done EVA. Not to say that 
their worked can’t be used, but it’ll require some “translation” to put it into an operational EVA 
environment. 
a. Thank you for this perspective. I’d actually like to discuss this point further offline with you to get 
your insight as to what those “translation” points might be. The primary purpose of including 
AMO is because this is the only study to date that has attempted to examine the impact of 
technological support for time-delayed ops (granted it wasn’t related to EVA) (Corrections made 
in Paper)  
[7] Section 2, 7th paragraph:  Concur with everything said, but keep in mind that the analog missions 
influenced a lot of the findings that lead to these identified challenges, and there was a lack of training with 
the crew and MCC for those missions due to time and budget constraints.  
a. Point taken, I’ll include some rephrasing to explain this point. PUT IN DISCUSSION SECTION  
[8] Section 3, 1st paragraph:  Can you explain more why you’re using a current EVA work domain but looking 
at communication from Apollo 16, and how those relate? 
a. I’m looking at current work domain because 1) This sort of examination of the EVA work domain 
isn’t present in the academic literature and for the purposes of my thesis (and my own personal 
understanding) I need to know how EVAs are currently done today. I can then build off of this 
present day work domain to start talking about future deep-space EVA work domains how things 
will change operationally to account for the time-delay. As for the Apollo 16 EVA 4, this is one of 
the only EVAs that has been conducted outside of LEO making this one of the one precedents we 
have for future EVAs beyond LEO. It was also one of the only data sources I had at the start of 
this work so I was basically working with what I had at the time. (Corrections made in Paper)   
[9] Section 3, 5th paragraph:  Was Apollo 16 EVA 4 used because it was a deep space EVA?  
a. Yes, I’ll try to make this point clear earlier in the paper. (Corrections made in Paper)    
[10] Section 4, 2nd paragraph:  It might be worth specifically noting that crew do receive some training on tasks 
that may be performed in unscheduled and contingency EVAs. 
a. Thank you for that clarification, I’ll add this to the paper (Corrections made in Paper) 
[11] Section 4, Figure 2:  Is the timeline margin equivalent to the padding (% time over the NBL time to allow 
for on orbit differences) we put into EVAs?  
a. I hadn’t specifically thought about that sort of padding (to account for NBL differences from on 
orbit), but yes that would also fit inside that discussion. I was basically trying to say that you can 
possibly get ahead of schedule in an EVA timeline. I’ll add this discussion point. (Corrections 
made in Paper) 
[12] Section 4, Figure 2:  What does the “Crib Sheet Region” indicate?  It’s possible to utilize the cribsheet 
anytime through the EVA. 
a. For this region, I am trying to say that for a given point in the timeline, there exists a tool (i.e. 
cribsheet) that can assist you in completing tasks that may not have been nominal. But the crib 
sheet can only help you for so many off-nominal tasks. As I understand it, the cribsheet is built to 
be as exhaustive as possible to account for any of the foreseen issues that may arise. But my point 
is that we can only foresee so many issues arising. (Corrections made in Paper)  
[13] Section 4, 7th paragraph:  Chatter on the MCC loops can actually be rather busy, even during nominal 
operations. 
a. Thanks for that point. I’ll try and clarify this statement (Corrections made in Paper)  
[14] Section 4, 8th paragraph (Off-Nominal Operations):  I’m not sure it’s true that the comm increases 
depending on the severity of the situation.  Sometimes the chatter can be rather minimal during those 
times as folks are extra vigilant to listen to the crew.  Chatter increases with the number of failures and 
with the timing. 
a. Thanks for that point. I’ll try and clarify this statement (Corrections made in Paper)  
[15] Section 5, 8th paragraph:  The EVA FCR controls the development of the checklists and procedures.  
a. Thank you for this insight, I’ve added this point to the paper. (Corrections made in Paper)  
[16] Section 5, 10th paragraph:  EVA Task also tracks the ahead/behind time based on the planned timeline. 
a. Thank you for this insight, I’ve added this point to the paper. (Corrections made in Paper) 
[17] Section 5, 11th paragraph:  You may want to stress that the EMU position is the primary person tracking 
the crew’s limited consumables (O2, power, CO2 scrubbing).  That’s going to be a critical difference with 
the Exploration missions due to the comm delay. 
a. Thank you for emphasizing this point, I’ll clarify this in the paper. I was thinking this was the case 
but again, my resources couldn’t tell me for sure this was the case. (Corrections made in Paper) 
[18] Section 5, 13th paragraph:  BME is actually one of the FCR positions, they just don’t work for the 
operations directorate. 
a. Thank you for emphasizing this point, I’ll clarify this in the paper. (Corrections made in Paper) 
[19] Section 5, EVA Information Flow Model, 3rd paragraph:  During real-time EVA ops, we primarily use the 
voice loops, flight notes, JEDI messages, Anomaly database, OSTPV (electronic crew timeline). 
a. Thank you  for clarifying, I simply omitted BME from the discussion since I didn’t think it really 
contributed to the conversation (Corrections made in Paper) 
[20] Section 5, EVA Information Flow Model, 4th paragraph:  There is a lot of “airwave” conversations 
between the flight director, Ground IV, and EVA FCR that is not over the comm loops. 
a. I’ve been looking into this chatter more recently and I need to add this as well. Thank you for 
emphasizing this point. I’d also like to talk more with you offline about what is actually being said 
in these conversations. (Corrections made in Paper) 
[21] Section 5, EVA Information Flow Model, 6th paragraph:  We rely on voice and video downlink, and we 
lose the video more than the audio, which does affect our situational awareness.  
a. Your statement aligns with what my sources also said. I’ll clarify this point in the paper. 
(Corrections made in Paper) 
[22] Section 5, EVA Information Flow Model, 8th paragraph:  The EVA FCR is concerned about the big 
picture of the EVA with respect to both the timeline and the EMU/Airlock, as well as how those affect or 
are affected by the vehicle systems.  The FCR has to keep the Task and EMU/Airlock coordinated in order 
to execute the EVA – for instance, the FCR determines whether or not to do a particular task based on 
timeline input from Task and consumable input from EMU.  The FCR also filters all of the data being 
received from the three MPSR positions.  
a. Thank you for providing this additional insight, I’ll make the appropriate modifications in the 
paper. (Corrections made in Paper) 
[23] Section 5, EVA Information Flow Model, 9th paragraph:  Communication in the flight control room is also 
complicated by the need to not step on (talk over) other operators or the crew.  A lot of information must 
be relayed between operators in succinct a manner as possible. 
a. This is another great discussion point I can include in the paper. Thank you (Corrections made in 
Paper) 
[24] Section 6:  Do you have any plans to extend the analysis to a more recent EVA? 
a. Yes, I have the Air-to-Ground EVA audio/video for EVA 26 (in progress), and then the EVA 15, 
16, 17 series that I plan on analyzing. I’m also pulling the MCC loops for EVA 26 to better 
understand the chatter that goes on. I would actually like to discuss with you any additional 
metrics or points of analysis you think would be worth extracting from these videos.  
[25] Section 6, 2nd paragraph:  The IV crewmembers were fully suited, correct?  That might be worth noting as 
a difference between this EVA and Shuttle/ISS EVAs. 
a. That’s a great point, you are correct, all three crew were fully suited and the entire cabin was 
depressed. This is also possibly analogous to what operations in Orion might be like. PUT IN 
DISCUSSION SECTION  
[26] Section 6, Figure 5:  I’m surprised CAPCOM talked so little during the EVA.  It might be good to see how 
that compares to ISS EVAs.  And also interesting to see how that compares to a delayed comm EVA from 
NEEMO. 
a. My thoughts exactly, I would love to see that comparison too. Once I get EVA 26 analyzed, I’d 
love to get my hands on NEEMO audio transcripts to make that comparison. Discussed in Future 
work 
[27] Section 6, Table IV:  Did the ground provide much direction to the crew, or were they basically 
conducting the EVA almost autonomously.  
a. I think this point is discussed a little later in the paper, but maybe I should make the point more 
clear. The crew was fairly autonomous. Ground really didn’t direct anything during the EVA. The 
crew really relied on their flight notes (cribsheets) for all activities. PUT IN DISCUSSION 
SECTION 
[28] Section 6:  Was the ground tracking any consumable status for the crew?  Since the EVA was so short, 
they may not have been. 
a. I couldn’t really tell if that was the case. There really was no mention of consumables throughout 
the entire transcript that I read. 
[29] Section 6, 6th paragraph:  The MEED experiment phase might be a good comparison for an Exploration 
science EVA as a more complicated task. 
a. That’s a good point to make. I’ll clarify this in the paper. PUT IN DISCUSSION SECTION 
[30] Section 6:  I’m assuming not, but there wasn’t a video camera showing any of the EVA, was there? That 
might change the voice comm a bit.  We commonly see things during ISS EVAs so that we don’t have to 
talk to the crew.  
a. This is also a good point to make, they did spend time setting up a camera but I’m not entirely sure 
how much MCC relied on that video/image feed. My impression was that they didn’t (there was 
quite a few instances of them having to readjust to ensure a good link with ground and there 
wasn’t really any evidence that MCC was leveraging the video all that much) PUT IN 
DISCUSSION SECTION 
[31] Section 7, 2nd paragraph:  One of the things affecting comm during DRATS (and NEEMO) was the lack of 
specific crew training and flight control team training.  We’ll more than likely end up with an onboard IV 
during Exploration missions, but the comm will be different with more dedicated training. 
a. So this point is exactly what I want my Thesis to contribute to. Understanding how that comm will 
be different in deep-space EVAs is one of the big-ticket items I’d like to address. I’m currently 
drafting my thesis proposal, which I’d love to discuss with you in further detail so we can make 
sure that I’m working towards this goal. I know you’ve been thinking about this problem a lot and 
I would appreciate any insight you may have. PUT IN DISCUSSION SECTION 
[32] Section 7, 3rd paragraph:  Training and planning will also be key to alleviating some of the time delay 
challenges. 
a. Yes, I agree. I’ll clarify this statement in the paper. (Corrections made in Paper) 
[33] Section 7, 4th paragraph:  AMO might have seen some comm breakdown due to the way they ran things, 
but we showed in RATS and NEEMO that you can work around the time delay.  
a. This is another great point that I’ll clarify in the paper. I’d also like to discuss with you in more 
detail about these work arounds that were found in RATS and NEEMO. (Corrections made in 
Paper) 
[34] Section 7, 4th paragraph:  Exploration missions will have scientists also making queries and requests of the 
EVA crew that will be very different from what we’ve seen with shuttle or station. 
a. True, I’ll add this distinction to the paper as well. (Corrections made in Paper) 
[35] Conclusions, 2nd paragraph:  In current EVAs, MCC also tracks the consumables, which is key function in 
EVAs. 
a. Yes, this is also another valuable insight that is worth mentioning. (Corrections made in Paper) 
 
